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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
COMMANDER
CARRIER AIR GROUP ONE HUNDRED TWO (CVG-102)
FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

CVG-102/REW:fl
A16-13
Serial: 031

22 November 1952

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From: Commander, Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34)

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO for the period 28 October through 22 November 1952; submission of

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4
(b) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1A

Encl: (1) Subject Action Report

1. This report is forwarded as enclosure (1) for inclusion in the action report of the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) in accordance with references (a) and (b).

G. P. CHASE

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (1)

[redacted]

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ACTION REPORT
OF
CARRIER AIR GROUP ONE HUNDRED TWO
FOR THE PERIOD
28 OCTOBER THROUGH 22 NOVEMBER

CONTENTS

PART I

MISSION AND COMPOSITION

MISSION:

1. The mission of Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO while assigned to Task Force 70 was to fly special photo missions and additional flights as assigned in support of the U.S. FORMOSAN Policy.

2. The mission upon reporting to Task Force 77 in the area off the east coast of Korea as a unit of the United Nations Naval Forces, was blockading the North Korean coast and pursuing a systematic program of inderdiction against enemy supply routes and destroying air facilities, power complexes, and manufacturing centers in North Korea to prevent further offensive action by the enemy. Close air support to frontline ground forces to be furnished upon request.

COMPOSITION:

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C 10/28	OPERATIONAL A/C 11/22	PILOTS 10/28	PILOTS 11/22
CVG-102 CDR G. P. CHASE Commanding	NONE	NONE	NONE	7	7
VF-781 LCDR S. R. HOLM Commanding	F9F-5	15	11	25	25

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UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C 10/28	OPERATIONAL A/C 11/22	PILOTS 10/28	PILOTS 11/22
VF-783 LCDR J. W. WYRICK Commanding	F9F-5	15	14	25	25
VF-874 LCDR M. D. CARMODY Commanding	F4U-4	14	14	24	24
VA-923 CDR J. C. MICHEEL Commanding	AD-3/AD-4	16	13	25	23
VC-3 (Det "G") LCDR G. W. STAEHELI Officer-in-Charge	F4U-5N	4	4	5	5
VC-11 (Det "G") LT H. F. GERNERT Officer-in-Charge	AD-4W	3	2	5	5
VC-35 (Det "G") LT W. P. KISER Officer-in-Charge	AD-4N	4	4	5	5
VC-61 (Det "G") LT J. F. GROSSER Officer-in-Charge	F2H-2P	3	2	5	5
TOTALS		74	64	126	124

NOTE: The Air Group Commander flys alternately with VF-781 and VA-923. The Air Group Staff Operations Officer flys with VF-783. A doctor designated as a Naval Aviator and four L.S.O.'s comprise the remaining five pilots on the staff and they do not fly from the ship.

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PART II
CHRONOLOGY

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28 October - Underway from YOKOSUKA, Japan with Task Force 70.

29 October - Underway with Task Force 70.

30 October - Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO, augmented by three aircraft and pilots of VMJ-1, flew 44 sorties, including 11 special photo missions. The photo missions accomplished one hundred percent coverage of assigned targets.

31 October - Underway to join Task Force 77 in the operating area.

1 November - Off the east coast of Korea as a unit of Task Force 77. Heavy seas caused cancellation of all flight operations. The rough swells were caused by a storm in the Gulf of Tatary.

2 November - Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO commenced its second Korean tour by flying the first strike ever launched against an enemy by the USS ORISKANY. It was delivered by pilots of VA-923, VF-874 and VF-783. Buildings were bombed and strafed in the vicinity of PYONGGANG in a coordinated strike of AD's and F4U's with CVG-7 aircraft. F9F's damaged three railroad cars just south of WONSAN. The jets, working recco routes, bombed and strafed a railroad intersection and warehouses at MUNCH'ON. A bridge and building were damaged at CHONGPYONG. Fuel tanks were set ablaze at YONDAE-RI. In the afternoon 4 large fires were started by the AD and F4U aircraft as supply areas and buildings near PYONGGANG were bombed and strafed. The jets of VF-781, Pacemakers, bombed along coastal recco routes, scoring 3 railcuts northwest of WONSAN. The total sorties for the day were 97, the total bombs dropped, 38.9 tons.

3 November - No flight operations - replenishment.

4 November - CVG-102 pilots, teamed with pilots of the USS BON HOMME RICHARD, bombed, strafed, and rocketed buildings, rail lines and supply areas causing extensive damage in the strategic PYONGGANG target area. The afternoon's principal efforts were conducted along coastal recco routes and package targets by both jets and props with damage unobserved. VC-61 reported 100% photo coverage of assigned targets.

ENS A. L. RIKER (VA-923) was reported missing in action after being shot down by anti-aircraft fire south of WONSAN. It is believed his parachute was observed settling to the ground, but intense flak precluded the possibility of continued observations. Air Group 102 flew 103 sorties and dropped 42 tons of bombs.

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5 November - AD's and F4U's successfully attacked Communist stockpiles along the front lines. Several secondary explosions were observed. Throughout the day the F9F's roamed enemy main supply routes destroying five trucks. Night Hecklers reported heavy vehicular traffic and scored several direct bomb hits on two columns of trucks causing a secondary explosion on each. 93 sorties dropped 47 tons of bombs this day.

6 November - Despite heavy seas, jets and props continued the attack against the enemy supply buildups in the vicinity of PYONGGANG at the apex of the Iron Triangle. Afternoon jet operations were cancelled because of marginal recovery conditions resulting from a badly pitching deck, but the props again delivered damaging ordnance to the CHEROKEE target complex. A total of 52 sorties dropped 44 tons of bombs.

7 November - No flight operations - replenishment.

8 November - Planes of Air Group 102 continued their attack on the Communists near the front lines, delivering 47 tons of bombs during 93 sorties. It was the best day so far with 6 buildings and 1 self-propelled gun destroyed. In addition 6 boats, 5 trucks, 1 bridge, 2 supply dumps, 11 buildings, and 1 radar installation were damaged.

9 November - VC-3 and VC-35 Hecklers damaged trucks and buildings along the HAMHUNG-WONSAN supply route. The early jet reccos destroyed 2 small boats and 2 warehouses. Three other boats and 6 warehouses were damaged as weather kept the planes along the coastal routes. Afternoon operations were cancelled because of frontal weather. Six tons of bombs were dropped during thirty-two sorties.

10 November - Ten vehicles were destroyed and 43 damaged and many secondary explosions were observed. The F4U's and AD's were credited with 100% coverage on their CAS missions. The jets, suppressing flak on the CHEROKEE targets along the front lines, aided the props in getting in for an estimated 75% coverage on the supply, ammo and personnel buildup areas. Sixty-two tons of bombs were dropped during 107 sorties.

11 November - No flight operations - replenishment.

12 November - No flight operations - weather.

13 November - No flight operations - weather.

14 November - No flight operations - weather. This frontal system located south of Korea caused four days of low overcast, drizzle and poor visibility.

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15 November - The AD's scored 4 cuts along the main supply route between MAJON-NI and YANGDOK. The F4U's provided close air support near the bombline. They were credited with 100% coverage of the designated targets as large secondary explosions were observed.

The jets destroyed one truck and further damaged five factory buildings and two bridges northwest of WONSAN.

Fifty-six sorties were flown and twenty-one tons of bombs dropped before bad weather forced cancellation of the remaining events.

LT George A. GAUDETTE, VA-923, is presumed to have been killed. His plane was observed to spin during a bombing run and crashed inverted near the target with no apparent chance for his survival.

16 November - The planes of the USS ORISKANY flew ninety-three sorties dropping sixty-one tons of bombs. The jets destroyed five buildings west of WONSAN while the props attacked camouflaged supply installations nearby. Several large fires were started. Afternoon jet recco sorties destroyed two trucks and damaged eleven.

17 November - Throughout the day CVG-102 flew ninety-two sorties dropping fifty-seven tons of bombs on vital industrial targets and supply storage sites at CHONGJIN and KILCHU. Sixteen buildings and warehouses were destroyed. Among them was a transformer plant and a distillery which was producing chemicals for explosives. Twenty-eight other buildings, ten railroad cars and two supply dumps were damaged.

18 November - The night hecklers were successful in their efforts as they reported exceptionally heavy vehicular traffic. Twenty-two trucks were destroyed and an estimated thirty-five others damaged, as numerous explosions and fires were observed. Planes from the USS ORISKANY teamed with those of the USS ESSEX and USS KEARSARGE in attacking enemy supply buildings, boats and bridges along the northeastern coastline. Our props destroyed eight buildings and damaged fifteen others. Five boats and one bridge were severely damaged. Seventy-three sorties were flown during which twenty tons of bombs were dropped.

While flying routine CAP, LT Royce WILLIAMS and LT John MIDDLETON of VF-781 shot down two MIG-15's after they had been attacked by the swept-wing jets. LTJG D. M. ROWLANDS of the same squadron is credited with damaging one additional MIG-15.

19 November - No flight operations - replenishment. After replenishment the USS ORISKANY departed Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN for YOKOSUKA, Japan.

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20 November - Enroute Yokosuka, Japan

21 November - Enroute Yokosuka, Japan

22 November - Arrived Yokosuka, Japan. End of reporting period.

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PART III

ORDNANCE

1. In all but exceptional cases the required ordnance loadings were accomplished in time to meet each launch, however, it was often done with difficulty. The presently assigned Air Group ordnance personnel are capable and well advanced in training, but are presently considered inadequate functionally and in number. A high percentage of petty officer rates are filled numerically by airman.

2. Many 250 pound bombs had a substance surrounding the nose and tail fuze cavities. In some cases this matter, of relatively hard consistency, along with rust and corrosion, prevented either nose or tail fuzing but rarely both. Upon investigating this exudate was found to be insensitive to shock and melted when a flame was applied to it.

3. One 20MM gun stoppage which was investigated disclosed that the brass cartridge containing the propellant charge had ruptured from what appeared to be a low order detonation, causing an HE1 to wedge in the gun chamber. The primer had not been struck by the firing pin or the next round. The cause of this malfunction remains undetermined.

4. A large number of shear pin failures have occurred on the MK9 Mod 2 rocket launchers. It is believed that the rocket lugs are either too large for the launcher or that the lug brackets are being assembled slightly off center. BuOrd Material Letter AVI-50, Change Two, contains plans for the construction of a template to aid in assembling rocket suspension bands. It is recommended that these templates be procured as a manufactured item achieving uniform proper tolerances.

5. Hung rockets occurring during this operational period can be broken down into three categories: duds, loose pigtails, and cut pigtails. Loose pigtails were the most common cause of hung rockets and occurred chiefly on the F9F-5's since rocket adapter rings now available do not fit this type of aircraft.

6. Excessive carbon from the MK 1 ejector cartridges used in the Douglas Bomb Ejector caused the foot assembly not to extend after 1 to 5 ejections. Normal operation for this ejector before cleaning is about 20 shots. MK 1 ejector cartridges, lot number 30 49 MRCS, are currently being used.

7. There were two accidental firings of 20MM guns recorded during this period. Both occured on AD-3 type aircraft.

a. First firing - Weak sear and lost hydraulic pressure cause of firing.

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b. Second firing - Immediately after recovery, normal clearing of the gun was commenced. When tension was released from the feed mechanism the gun breech block went home, firing one round. Investigation revealed that the receiver was cracked which would be a possible cause for the sear to engage improperly.

To eliminate inadvertant firing of guns during clearing, VA-923 now employs the following procedure: Inspect cockpit gun switches to insure master arming switch is off and gun switches on safe. Both guns are then inspected for stoppages and bolt position. Check to see that pressure is on gun charger. Guns are then cleared. Gun switch is next put on off position and guns are then released to battery. When loading guns, ammunition is wound in with bolt forward and with gun switch on off position while gun charging and gun circuit breakers are pulled.

EXPENDITURE:

Type Ordnance	AD-3,AD-4 (VA-923)	AD-4N (VC-35)	F4U-4 (VF-874)	F4U-5N (VC-3)	F9F-5 (VF-781)	F9F-5 (VF-783)	TOTALS
2000# GP	28						28
1000# GP	137		16				153
500# GP	270	10	134	21			435
250# GP	565	37	313	12	237	246	1410
FRAGS	178	4	78	32	62	33	387
100# GP	42	52	72	62	174	178	580
ATAR, 5"	156		221		95	113	585
20MM	6312	5820		8150	22688	31845	74815
50MM CAL			85600				85600

HUNG ORDNANCE:

Type Ordnance	Aero 14A	Mk55	Mk51	Mk 9	Douglas Bomb Ejector	TOTALS
2000# GP						
1000# GP						
500# GP			3		1	4
250# GP	15					15
FRAGS	1	4				5
100# GP	11	1	2			14
ATAR, 5"	22			10		32

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DISPOSITION OF HUNG ORDNANCE:

Type Ordnance	Later Manual Release	Release by Maneuvering	Remaining on Rack	Drop Offs On Landing	TOTALS
2000# GP					
1000# GP					
500# GP			4		4
250# GP			15		15
FRAGS			5		5
100# GP			14		14
ATAR, 5"			28	4	32

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART IV

DAMAGE

DAMAGE INFLICTED ON ENEMY:

TARGET	DESTROYED	DAMAGED	PROB. DAMAGE
Boats	2	31	8
Trucks	36	118	6
Locomotives		2	
Ox Carts	1		
Highway Bridges		13	
Supply Dumps	3	26	
Factories		1	
Barracks		1	
Buildings	47	141	1
Warehouses	13	13	
Gun Emplacements	16	21	
Radar Installations	1	2	
Power Installations	1	1	
Bunkers	13	24	
RR Cars	1	22	
RR Bridges		3	
Rail Cuts		16	
Ammunition Dumps	1	1	
Trenches	220 Yards		
Highway Cuts	9		
Troops	10		
RR Tunnels		2	
Enemy MIG-15 A/C	2	1	

COMBAT LOSS OF AIRCRAFT

DATE	SQUADRON	TYPE	BUNO.	CAUSE	CODE
11-4-52	VA-923	AD-3	122823	Probable Enemy Anti-Aircraft	L
11-15-52	VA-923	AD-3	122786	Possible Enemy Anti-Aircraft	L

DAMAGE INFLICTED BY ENEMY ON OWN AIRCRAFT

DATE	UNIT	TYPE	BUNO.	CAUSE	CODE
11-6-52	VF-874	F4U-4	97210	Small Arms fire	D-3
11-15-52	VF-781	F9F-5	125969	Small Arms fire	D-3
11-15-52	VF-781	F9F-5	125448	Small Arms fire	D-3
11-18-52	VF-781	F9F-5	125459	Enemy A/C Machine gun fire	D-2

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OPERATIONAL LOSS OF AIRCRAFT

DATE	UNIT	TYPE	BUNO.		CODE
11-15-52	VC-61	F2H-2P	126692	Loss of radio and instruments while above overcast.	L

OPERATIONAL DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRAFT

DATE	UNIT	TYPE	BUNO	CAUSE	DAMAGE	CODE
11/1/52	VA-923	AD-3	122835	Rough weather shifted aircraft tied down and chocked.	Rudder	D-3
11/6/52	VF-781	F9F-5	125954	Hard carrier landing (pilot VF-783).	Collapsed left landing gear	D-2
11/6/52	VF-781	F9F-5	125979	Hard carrier landing.	Collapsed landing gear	D-2
11/6/52	VF-781	F9F-5	125949	Taxi on wet deck.	Main nose structure	D-2
11/6/52	VA-923	AD-3	122742	Barrier on landing.	Multiple	D-2
11/15/52	VF-783	F9F-5	125312	Broken hook point on carrier landing, barrier	Landing gear fairing and scissors	D-3
11/15/52	VC-11	AD-4W	125781	Hard Landing	Collapsed Tail Wheel	D-2

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PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE:

1. The performance of Air Group personnel during this period is considered excellent. Personnel allowances appear to be adequate with the possible exception of ordnancemen. If future experience demonstrates the need for more ordnancemen, comments will be made in a subsequent report.

CASUALTIES:

1. On 4 November while on a strike mission, ENS Andrew L. RIKER III, USNR, 551337, piloting the last plane in the flight, was observed taking evasive action after having completed a bombing run. As the flight was rendezvousing a transmission was received stating that a parachute was visible (later comfirmed by a strike flash report from the USS KEARSARGE). ENS RIKER was missed upon rendezvous and an immediate search of the area was conducted but without positive results. Mirror flashes and flashlight signals were observed later in the area and Air Force planes made several night and day searches for approximately one week with no positive results. Searches were also launched from Carrier Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN. No evidence is available to verify ENS RIKER's status as other than missing in action.

2. On 15 November an AD piloted by LT George A. GAUDETTE Jr., USNR, 453144, was observed in a spin over the target at 7000 feet at a dive angle of about fifty degrees. The plane continued in a violent spin, crashed, and exploded upon contact with the ground. No one was observed leaving the aircraft and the pilot was presumed killed in action.

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PART VI

OPERATIONS

1. During the period 28 October through 22 November 1952, Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO completed 929 sorties and flew a total of 2,183.7 hours during 11.5 operating days. Four and one half days' operations were canceled because of weather. The Air Group averaged 80.7 completed sorties per operating day. The average number of flights for the propellor pilots was 6.7 and for the jet pilots was 8.7. During the period of this report flight operations were conducted only one day in the month of October without expenditure of any ordnance. Therefore, separate monthly statistical summaries were not prepared for the flights of 30 October and they are presented with the data for operations conducted through 22 November 1952.

2. Highlight of the period was a 15 minutes dogfight with seven MIG-15 aircraft by three ORISKANY CAP pilots on 18 November. The action took place about 38 miles bearing 155 degrees from POLUOSTROV GAMOVA and bearing 010 degrees approximately 45 miles from the Task Force which was operating southeast of the North Korean city of CHONGJIN.

The CAP, consisting of four F9F-5s from the Pacemaker squadron, VF-781, had descended from their assigned altitude to 13,000 feet because the plane of the division leader, LT Claire R. ELWOOD, experienced a fuel boost pump failure.

The ORISKANY's Air Controllers, who had CAP control, warned them of approaching bogies and vectored them to intercept. Initial contact by C.I.C. was about 345 degrees 83 miles. Detaching his section, LT Royce WILLIAMS took the lead, commenced climbing, and at 15,000 feet gave a tallyho upon sighting seven condensation trails and identified MIGs flying very high.

In a loose abreast formation, they came approximately overhead, made a descending turn and split into two groups, as though to bracket.

At this point the Pacemakers lost contact as the MIG condensation trails had ceased.

Because of his engine trouble LT ELWOOD and his wingman, LTJG John D. MIDDLETON, remained at 13,000 feet. Meanwhile, LT WILLIAMS and his wingman, LTJG David M. ROWLANDS, continued their climb to 26,000 feet under CAP control since visual contact had been lost. As they leveled off, the two Panther jets spotted four MIGs initiating a flatside firing attack from the ten o'clock position.

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LT WILLIAMS broke his section "hard left" in a defensive counter and spoiled the effectiveness of the run, although he could not bring his own guns to bear. The MIGs recovered to the right in a strung out position with the fourth plane especially far back. LT WILLIAMS continued his wrapped up turn and brought his section around for a tail-end shot on the last MIG. Firing from 15° off the tail, his first burst from the four 20MM guns put the enemy jet into a smoking, uncontrolled spiral. LTJG ROWLANDS followed the crippled MIG down to 8,000 feet where it was last seen smoking in a steep, graveyard spiral. Gun camera film confirmed the kill.

When the straggler was shot down, the three remaining MIGs pulled away rapidly in a climbing turn from LT WILLIAMS. When out of range, they split and once again attempted to bracket the lone F9F-5. The section made a high-side run in loose formation. WILLIAMS rolled into a sharp counter and got a head-on burst at the second MIG. The Communist pilots seemed reluctant to press home a head-on attack and fired from far out. In the dogfight that followed, WILLIAMS continued to counter and succeeded in exchanging short bursts at various angles of deflection, largely head-on.

At one time he found himself dead astern of a MIG. Immediately after he fired, the MIG dropped his dive brakes and LT WILLIAMS had to break sharply to the right and pull up to prevent collision. The MIG may have been damaged by this burst.

During this dogfight, the MIGs were able to turn and maneuver with the F9F-5 with apparent ease. The fight was fought with the F9F-5 at a continuous 100% RPM. When a MIG wished to break away, he pulled away in a rapid, climbing turn to recover the advantage for another pass.

LTJG ROWLANDS climbed up to rejoin his section leader and the air battle turned into a melee. It may be that the three MIGs unaccounted for had now joined in the fracas. The pilots had extreme difficulty keeping track of the MIGs. As ROWLANDS reached the scene of action, a MIG made a head-on run, firing from far out and breaking sharply to the left in a steep climbing turn. With planes all around him, ROWLANDS found himself in an advantageous position with a MIG in his sights. Firing a long burst, he started it smoking but was diverted by another jet attacking him. The MIG and the F9F-5 ended up circling with neither jet gaining the advantage. The MIG finally leveled his wings and climbed away rapidly.

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Another MIG turned inside WILLIAMS and scored a hit, seriously damaging the F9F-5. A high explosive shell severed rudder controls and knocked out the aileron boost. With the MIG still firing on his tail, WILLIAMS dove for a cloud bank 10,000 feet below him and approximately 10 miles away. ROWLANDS followed, although out of ammo by this time. He flew almost a loose wing position on the enemy jet in an effort to drive him off.

About this time LTJG John D. MIDDLETON was vectored up to aid his two squadron mates. His indoctrination to aerial combat was a head-on run by one of the swept-wing jets who came in from the two o'clock position. LT MIDDLETON countered him and simultoneously saw LT WILLIAMS, a MIG and ROWLANDS diving toward the cloud bank. As he dove to render aid, a MIG made another run on MIDDLETON. On breaking away the enemy plane reversed course and apparently lost the F9F-5 in the sun, for he remained in perfect position for a 90 degree deflection shot. MIDDLETON tracked him, fired from far out, and continued firing as the MIG's superior speed caused the Panther to tail in behind him. The pilot bailed out and MIDDLETON saw the plane crash into the sea and the pilot land in the water.

Meanwhile LT WILLIAMS and ROWLANDS reached the safety of cloud cover and after flying in the "soup" for about 5 minutes received a steer to the Task Force which was under the overcast. They made individual let-downs breaking out in the clear at 1200 feet. The crippled Panther made a successful landing aboard, followed by the other three Pacemakers.

As LT WILLIAMS was returning to the Task Force, a standby CAP was launched from the ORISKANY. Led by the skipper of the Pacemakers, LCDR Stan HOLM, the division broke thru the overcast at 11,000 feet in time to see two MIGs high make a sweeping turn and disappear to the northwest at high speed.

It is felt that the success of what is believed to be the Navy's first jet dogfight with MIG-15s is attributable to the following factors:

a. Defensive tactics developed and practiced by the Air Group in countering at the right moment when a high speed jet is definitely committed to his run.

b. Continual practice of a sound look-out doctrine.

c. Aggressiveness of the pilots and their ability to fly the airplane to the maximum of its potentiality.

d. The excellent performance of the 20MM guns and the APG-30 radar ranging gunsight.

e. The seeming inexperience of these particular Communist pilots in their failure to take greater advantage of their high performance aircraft.

3. Limited experience during the period of this report indicates that the launch to recoverytime should not exceed 1.5 hours for the F9F-5. It is recommended that an hour and a half be the maximum scheduled flight time.

4. The six Aero 14A launchers have been adequate to carry any practical external ordnance loading. The use of MK51 bomb racks has been discouraging because of the tremendous decrease in performance resulting from their installation. With two 1,000 pound G.P. bombs, cruising out at 15,000' and returning at 10,000', with 1,000 pounds of fuel remaining upon arriving back over the force, the radius of action is approximately 185 miles with a total problem time before a required CHARLIE of about 74 minutes. Even more significant than the short time in the air available when the aircraft is used as an attack plane, is the startling reduction in Vmax as opposed to the clean F9F-5 on CAP. Because the aircraft are flown alternately on both missions throughout the day, it is infeasible to be putting on and taking off the MK51 bomb racks. It is recommended that the six Aero 14A launchers comprise the only external ordnance carrying stations on the F9F-5.

5. Photo escort of the F2H-2P has been accomplished as a routine mission without difficulty. The F2H-2P aircraft have not been using tip tanks.

6. Emphasis has been increased on ECM search missions. Search has been on TN 128 and 129 using two planes for simultaneous bearings to locate enemy radars. VC-35 Detachment GEORGE departed with only two TN 128s which doesn't allow a standby aircraft to be properly equipped. No searches have been ordered on TN 130 or 131. However, one TN 130 has been ordered. No radar controlled AA was encountered at night, but the enemy is known to have such equipment. Therefore, ECM operators are on the alert for that type radar signals. It is recommended that future AD-4N detachments deploy with a minimum of one TN 130 and three each of TN 128, 129, and 131 ECM equipments.

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SUMMARY OF COMPLETED SORTIES BY MISSION

MISSION	VF-781 F9F-5	VF-783 F9F-5	VF-874 F4U-4	VA-923 AD-3,4	VC-3 F4U-5N	VC-11 AD-4W	VC-35 AD-4N	VC-61 F2H-2P	TOTAL
OFFENSIVE:									
Strike	42	45	95	117					299
Recco	70	66							136
NGF			25	3	2				30
ECM Escort			10	8					18
Photo								21	21
Photo Escort	9	8							17
CAS			29	39					68
Sweep	8	7							
ECM				4			10		14
Heckler					19		14		33
Search			2	2					4
TAR CAP	5	8							13
TOTAL OFFENSIVE	134	136	161	173	21		24	21	668
DEFENSIVE:									
CAP	92	87							179
ASP				1		27	1		29
AEW						1			1
ASP Escort				22			8		30
AEW Escort				1					1
Mine Cover			2		2				4
	92	87	2	24	2	28	9		244
MISCELLANEOUS:					6		10	1	17
TOTAL MISSIONS	226	221	163	197	29	28	43	22	929
ABORTED MISSIONS	1	4	3	1	1	1	0	0	11
Average Sorties Per Pilot	8.7	8.6	7.1	7.5	6.0	5.6	9.0	4.0	
Average Flight Hours Per Pilot	13.5	13.9	21.2	23.0	20.1	16.9	24.2	6.9	

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PART VII

AIR INTELLIGENCE

1. It was found that no one method of setting up display boards and equipment sufficed for all ready rooms. Variations were made according to the type aircraft and missions flown. All squadron Air Intelligence Officers found, however, that a well displayed and conveniently located AMS L552, plastic terrain model map of Korea, scale 1:250,000, was of considerable value both for debriefing purposes and preflight tactical planning. In addition, it was useful during the initial phases of the target briefing. The targets and assigned recco routes were pointed out with relation to Korea as a whole. This relative position often became significant, as in the case of targets or recco routes in close proximity to the bombline or restricted areas.

2. A majority of the pilots in the jet squadrons have expressed a preference for AMS L552 series charts with hill shading over the AAC charts. It is recommended due to the high usage factor experienced by this Air Group that the AMS L552 series charts be doubled over the number indicated in CinCPacFlt Instruction 3840.1A.

3. Considerable difficulty in debriefing of returning pilots was originally experienced. Distractions in the ready rooms were numerous. The distractions were significantly reduced by providing curtained-off debriefing sections in the rear of the ready rooms. It is recommended that when a carrier departs for a Korean tour, all ready rooms be equipped with curtain-enclosed debriefing sections.

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PART VIII

SURVIVAL

1. The Mk-4 anti-exposure suit is acceptable to the majority of pilots. However, the following troubles were experienced:

a. Seventy-two per cent of the suits tested in swimming pools for water tightness had objectionable leaks. The greatest number of leaks occurred around the seal of the right hip, at the boots and around the fly. Resealing the overlapping seams with ample sealer and resealing the boot to the suit corrected the majority of leaks. The fly leaks were stopped by sealing the fly up on the inside. It is recommended that quality control inspection by the responsible government agency be rigorously enforced until the contractor has proven his product.

b. The G-Suit hose fitting is most difficult to rig with the rubber tube fitting of the exposure suit and has forced the majority of pilots to abandon the use of the G-Suit when wearing the exposure suit. The suits were fitted and worked on aboard ship enroute to Japan. It was discovered that the supply on board was limited in range of sizes in both suits and boots, resulting in several misfits too late for correction. Facilities for attaching the boots to the suits are inadequate aboard ship. In fitting the suits clothing sizes were often substituted for measurements, particularly in regards to neck sizes. Loose fitting shirt collars are not an indication of men's actual neck measurements. This resulted in some necks being cut too loose and more leaks. These loose fitting neck pieces were replaced. It is recommended that all Air Groupsbe completely outfitted with all survival equipment before departing from the United States. This Air Group was requested to wait for the Mk 4 suit which was delivered in sporadic lots of varying sizes of suits, inner-liners and boots from the time deploying from San Diego until after arriving in Yokosuka, Japan. Particular effort should be made to have all immersion suits carefully fitted from actual measurements and in the possession of the users before their departure west. It is further recommended that a better designed G-Suit fitting on the anti-exposure suit be incorporated to facilitate its use.

c. Several squadrons have hung a parachute harness by the risers to an overhead beam and had pilots in full winter immersion gear try to get out for a water landing after bailout. In many cases it was very difficult, and in some impossible, to unbuckle the harness. Many could not reach across their chests with either hand to reach the leg strap snap-on fittings. To unfasten the leg straps required both hands, thus some could not get the leg straps unfastened. The pilot cannot loosen the leg straps and sit on the seat, thus must hang by the chest strap. This problem has been reduced by fastening six inch tabs to the friction type buckles of the leg straps. When the tabs are pulled the leg straps are easily loosened, allowing them to be unsnapped with one

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hand. It is recommended that consideration be given to providing flying personnel with a sure means for disengaging themselves from their parachute harnesses after bailout when they are in anti-exposure suits.

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PART IX

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL

1. Many man hours were expended in correcting numerous F9F-5 hydraulic leaks. "O" rings throughout the system developed leaks and required changing. Quick disconnect fittings in the plenum chamber were another major source of hydraulic leaks. The leaks discovered were too general throughout the hydraulic system to provide specific data upon which to base recommendations for correction.

2. Cracking of the F9F-5 outboard partial rib of the stub wing caused much concern until it was determined not to be a safety of flight item. It is believed that these cracks are the result of catapult launchings because this activity has no knowledge of land-based aircraft experiencing similar difficulties.

3. No unusual difficulties were encountered with the F9F-5 Holley Fuel Control until 17 November 1952 on which date the Task Force commenced operations in colder weather. The first of a series of eighteen similar malfunctions appeared under the following conditions:

a. The F9F-5 was engaged in a routine Combat Air Patrol at a practically unvaried altitude of 20,000 feet with a fixed throttle position for approximately forty-five minutes.

b. With a power setting of approximately 82% RPM auto-acceleration of the engine was observed. Engine RPM accelerated to 96% and throttle motion in either direction had no apparent effect.

c. During descent for return to base the pilot noted that he had regained throttle control after a loss of approximately 3,000 feet.

d. On the following day seventeen auto-accelerations or throttle control losses occurred as follows:

CASE	POWER SETTING	ALTITUDE MALFUNCTION	MINUTES AT ALTITUDE	ALTITUDE CONTROL REGAINED	MAXIMUM AUTO ACCELERATION
2	82%	20,000	60	16,000	ZERO
3	82%	20,000	60	16,000	92%
4	84%	20,000	30	15,000	91%
5	80%	25,000	15	18,000	95%
6	80%	25,000	20	15,000	90%
7	84%	24,000	5	20,000	ZERO
8	82%	25,000	10	19,500	94%
9	84%	24,000	20	20,000	ZERO
10	82%	25,000	40	19,000	ZERO
11	82%	25,000	40	17,000	97%

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CASE	POWER SETTING	ALTITUDE MALFUNCTION	MINUTES AT ALTITUDE	ALTITUDE CONTROL REGAINED	MAXIMUM AUTO-ACCELERATION
12	85%	25,000	45	19,000	90%
13	86%	25,000	45	- - -	92%
14	82%	25,000	45	18,000	98%
15	92%	28,000	3	18,000	104%
16	92%	28,000	5	18,000	94%
17	92%	28,000	5	18,000	94%

In addition to the above, pilots of two other aircraft under similar flight conditions observed low fuel boost pressure warning lights glowing. After approximately 3,000 feet altitude descent the warning lights were observed to go out.

e. On the 18th of November the climatic conditions in the operating area were as follows:

ALTITUDE	TEMPERATURE	% RELATIVE HUMIDITY
15,000	-32	40
20,000	-40	30
25,000	-50	20

f. No reason for this abnormal behavier has been determined.

4. Limited hangar deck space afforded by the 27 ABLE conversion presents a maintenance problem. The resultant delays in the moving of aircraft due to the lack of space for respotting aircraft has had a definitely adverse effect on availability.

5. Aviation electronics maintenance has been very satisfactory. There were no AOG's due to electronic discrepancies. The capacity of the ship's deck edge 28 volt d. c. supply is not adequate at times of peak maintenance activity. Careful coordination and optimum use of APU's does not prevent loss of some maintenance time while waiting for a 28 volt source.

6. The material problem is not considered serious even though a few AOG's have adversely affected aircraft availability. The AD-3 and F2H-2P aircraft have been critical on AOG's. An abnormally high percentage (40-50%) of the 6AK5 vacuum tubes drawn from stock were unusable because of gas. All of these tubes were of 1943 to 1945 manufacture. The support received from the aviation supply department has been highly satisfactory.

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AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY

UNIT	TYPE	AVG. A/C ON BOARD	AVG. A/C AVAIL.	PERCENTAGE AVAIL.
VF-781	F9F-5	13.1	11.1	91%
VF-783	F9F-5	15.	13.1	86%
VF-874	F4U-4	14.	13.	91%
VA-923	AD-3/AD-4	14.	12.9	90%
VC-3	F4U-5N	4.	3.6	90%
VC-11	AD-4W	2.9	2.2	73%
VC-35	AD-4N	4.	3.7	93%
VC-61	F2H-2P	2.8	1.8	63%

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